The Effect of Energy Security on Future Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions and Operations

Essay

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Abstract

This paper tackles the bond between international security and the availability of energy in varied forms, stressing the influence these various forms of energy (gas supplies, oil stocks, nuclear energy and sustainable energy) have on the leading role taken by the European Union, which was given competence in the Energy Policy following the treaty of Lisbon, as well as in crisis management and conflict prevention. Delving into a number of such operations, these influences have been researched and reviewed taking into full consideration the legal framework of the EU energy policy objectives that are to be found in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the European Energy Security Strategy.

In order to fully comprehend how the CSDP as a whole is influenced by the security of the EU's availability for energy resources, and also by its import and export policies, it is of tremendous importance that we process through this paper the essence of the European Union's import habits, energy dependencies and how all these represent the "spark" that ignites the whole EU's energy sector grid. We have therefore explored alternatives to the actual suppliers of energy and analyzed the circumstances and risks of considering them. Only after doing so can we create a vision on how the energy security is handled at present and predict how it will be handled in the future. We found out how the CSDP objectives could be implemented in order to securely follow the strategy and goals of the Union (currently set for 2030) in terms of the energy sector development. It was crucial to identify and include in our research the ever-growing problem of climate change threatening the course and development of the defence policies involving the European Union, and how heavily the climate affects the CSDP missions and operations.

Keywords

Energy security, CSDP missions and operations, energy dependence, energy crisis, renewable energy.

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2. Preface

There is a universally applicable rule we, cadets, are taught about in the very first years of our engineering studies. Every action has an equally opposite reaction: Newton's third law of motion. What this essay seeks to acquire is the translation of this scientific law into a rather humanized interpretation by exploring the meaning of the energy resources we, as a community, are responsible for. In order to fully grasp the concept of energetic security, we must anticipate the implications of such a topic in the current geopolitical context. While conducting the research process for this paper, I could not help but notice a rather unpredictable course of action and, needless to say, an anticlimactic characteristic of its evolution. The non-linear path of this topic, unpredictable as it is, gets more and more interesting as we approach it from the angle of actual security and defence procedures, missions and operations, especially those conducted by the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Furthermore, while exploring the requirements that a reliable energy security policy needs to properly function, we will review the involved statistics, technical realities, limitations, and possible or further developments that could either improve or periclitate such a policy. More thought-provoking is that "often energy security issues are addressed only at a national level without taking fully into account the interdependence of Member States"[1]. Technicalities are often different from state to state, and while infrastructure is by far the most important aspect of energetic security, it is the internal regulations and external coordination that assemble the greater picture of a secure European Union under CSDP's protection. The greater picture is yet to be seen.

[1]Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy. Paragraph 5.
URL:https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN

3. Introduction

Before laying down a proper introduction, it is fundamental that we provide a proper background for the two main components of this paper: energy security and the objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy and how they are confined in the European Union, thus tracing a dependence between the two that will be tackled in the future chapters of the essay.

Energy security has multiple definitions, most of them based on the point of view approached. They can be characterized according to the sources of risk, the scope of the impacts, and the severity filters in the form of the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts.[2]However, the majority of these definitions conclude in the same, following remark: energy security represents the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price[3].

While standardized definitions were to be avoided initially, it is necessary for the proper constitution of this paper that we detail what the CSDP is. The Common Security and Defence Policy is part of the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) which provides the European Union's capabilities of strengthening the international security of the state members, accessing both military and civilian resources. The 2016 EU Global Strategy lays out the strategy for the CSDP, while the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the institutional aspects and strengthens the role of the European Parliament.[4] It is paramount to identify that the CSDP is subject to the European Council and The Council of the European Union decisions, with the European Parliament right to scrutinise it.[5]

The tie between the CSDP and the ever-evolving parameters of energy security is the foundation of this essay. The agenda will debate how the European Union can become less energy-dependable from the eastern states and how important it is for this to be addressed from the CSDP approach.

[2]Winzer C. (2012). Energy Policy.Volume 46.Elsevier. Pg. 36-48.
[3]The International Energy Agency. What is energy security? URL:
https://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/whatisenergysecurity/
[4]European Parliament factsheet on CSDP.
URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy
[5]Cf.:Ibid. Paragraph 3.

How can the Member states securely carry out the "the largest infrastructure transformation ever, with the transformation from fossil fuel driven power plants to renewable energy"?[6]. Are CSDP missions required to ensure the successful implementation of these objectives? These questions are subject to our capability to both studying the influence energy security had on the past operations conducted through CSDP and also anticipating how the dependency factor will change in time.

[6]Edited by Rehrl J. Handbook on CSDP. Volume I. P.135

4. Current state of Research

While maintaining energy security is clearly an objective for the CSDP, it is known that both of them are part of a three-front war with the following: climate change, geopolitical conflicts and ill-intentioned actors using energy for geopolitical coercion[7]. The above listed threats will be extensively analyzed and provided with in-depth statistics in order to fully comprehend how fragile and low-tolerant this "energy security grid" is.

4.1. Energy security: past and present

The winters of 2006 and 2009 represented the alarms that went off all across Europe. "Europe is facing an energy crisis. We now live in an era of energy uncertainty. The days of cheap and abundantly available energy are over."[8] Unfortunately, these two sentences accurately described the energy flow that had been streaming through Europe over that period of time. In order to properly characterize what the years above actually meant for the European Union, it is appropriate to provide some key facts. This can often lead to a number of vulnerabilities and the consumer is unable to contain any damage done by such specific vulnerability. [9]

The years 2006 and 2009 were subject to the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes, which found two state-owned, oil and natural gas companies, conflicting mainly over prices, supply quantities and debts owed. The situation escalated on 1 January 2006, when Russia reduced pipeline pressure and cut off supply to Ukraine. As a consequence, other EU countries suffered from the domino effect following the decision: Romania, Hungary and Poland, for example.

[7]Hunziker B. The current state of European energy security and transatlantic cooperation. URL: https://atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/energysource-explains-european-energy-security-and-transatlantic-cooperation-a-current-assessment/
[8] Cf.: Europe's Energy Crisis. The no fuel solution – EWEA Briefieng. February 2006.
[9] Cf.: EU imports of energy – recent developments. Eurostat statistics. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf



Figure 1: Map of oil and gas pipelines from Russia to Europe.

History repeated itself in 2009 when tension rose so high that Russia completely halted the flow of gas through Ukraine, affecting the above mentioned Member states, adding Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.

4.2. CSPD missions and operations in energy focal zones

The CSDP's efforts are concentrated in military and civilian missions and operations. As stated before, there are over fifteen such cases all over the world. And since the threats that the energy security is currently facing are the same the CSDP tries to prevent and oppose, there is a clear and indisputable correlation between the two.

Approaching the situation from the geopolitical perspective, what is worth mentioning is that the civilian mission EUAM Ukraine, standing for the European Union Advisory Mission. Its main objective is to encourage and assist authorities in reforming the civilian security sector, but it is also important to acknowledge the energy security aspect. If supplies of energy are to be cut off again, reduplicating the 2006 and 2009 disputes, the civilian population will, once again, find itself in despair. The immediate course of action for the EUAM is to observe, advise and assist the authorities in regaining stability.

4.3. Climate change

Another well-known and highly debated hazard is climate change. The energy security is directly influenced by the consequences of climate change and vice-versa, with poorly designed, polluting energy systems and resources affecting and accelerating the already advanced process of climate change.

The high demand for affordable energy determines high cost and more difficult emissions reductions, thus discouraging an engagement to use "clean energy" and to hold them responsible for their high rate of emissions.[10] This is of tremendous importance because the European Union, being the first economic power in the world, currently setting out to replace 32% of its energy with renewable energy by 2030.

"The developing countries are among the most affected. People living there often depend heavily on their natural environment and they have the least resources to cope with the changing climate."[11]. Gradually, the specific zone finds itself in a state of conflict and turmoil. The CSDP is well placed within this sequence, as it is engaged in both maintaining the stability in such regions, with missions like EUBAM Libya, EUTM/EUCAP Mali, but not less than in supervising the very security of the European Union's borders.

[10]Cf.: Boqiang L. Balancing energy security and climate change. URL: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2012/10/balancing-energy-security-and-climate-change/
[11]Climate change consequences. European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/change/consequences_en

5. Research gap

The latest energy security facts and statistics place the European Union in a “gray” zone. Geopolitical interests, climate change and pressure to maintain the “clean energy” trend will all have important effects on the energy politics and policy in the years to come. For the EU member states Russia is the most convenient partner in terms of energy supply, but the convenience/stability ratio regarding natural gas delivery is pretty low and defined by geopolitical uncertainty. Even if stronger, more reliable efforts are made in the direction of renewable energy, the technicalities can easily interfere with keeping the energy flow constant. This introduces a new aspect of the problem, specifically if the European Union should whether invest or not in renewable energy exported from the developing countries. Also, the CSDP missions and operations are fighting the actual threats that climate change induces, forming a hazardous loop that has not been approached before.

6. Research questions

At the foundation of our research lie a number of important questions to be addressed. For instance, having understood that the European Union is, at the moment, a "victim" of eastern embargo on oil and natural gases, the most reasonable question to ask is whether or not the Member states actually have any other alternatives. To what extent are the middle-eastern states reliable when it comes to assuring a safe and constant gas export to the Union? Another topic of debate is the role of CSDP's civilian or military missions in assisting the safe flow of energy, taking into consideration the numberless critical situations and problems CSDP representatives are confronted with, like war-torn zones, low region stability and poor infrastructure, and which obviously gain precedence on their already busy agenda. Could the East turn out to be more hostile while progressively giving up Russian energy? If some years ago these questions were subject to the "what if" expression, in the present they require our uninterrupted attention and research competence: "now what?".

7. Methodology

Undoubtedly, all of the questions above have a more or less conclusive answer. In order to properly address them, a number of specific steps have been taken. Analytical data has been collected and reviewed from sources directly correlated to the institutions of the European Union, such as the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and The Council on the matter of the European Energy Security Policy. After a solid, statistic-based foundation has been laid down, we advanced in the research process by exploring solutions to the threats and "geopolitical dilemmas". With documents from the European Council on Foreign Relations, this paper reviews possible alternatives to the EU's current energy suppliers, discussing the implications these "workarounds" could have on the stability of the Union and its foreign affairs.



Figure 2: Pyramid scheme of the desired approach[12]

[12] Figure created by the author for the purpose of this chapter.

8. Research and results of research

8.1. Statistical data on energy security

The European Union imports 53% of the energy it consumes.[13] The main forms of imported energy are common to those stated in the introduction as it follows: crude oil (90%), natural gas (65%), solid fuel (42%) and nuclear fuel (40%).[14]

Russia is the main provider of energy for most of the member states which, in the first semester of 2019 imported 39% of their natural gases and 27% of their petroleum oil from the Russian Federation, followed by Norway which provided 29% of the natural gases and 11% of the petroleum oils the Member states import. [15]



Figure 3: EU imports of energy products, 2015- first semester of 2019[16]

With these statistics in mind, it is important that we define the energy security approaching it from the dependency angle. As mentioned in the part dealing with energy

[13] Cf.: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. European Energy Security Strategy. Paragraph 3.
URL:https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN
[14]Cf.:Ibid.
[15]EU imports of energy – recent developments. Eurostat statistics. URL:
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/46126.pdf
[16]Ibid.

imports, the EU depends mainly on Russia for imports of crude oil, natural gas and solid fuels, then on Norway for crude oil and natural gas.[17]

With the intention of addressing all this data, the European Commission released in 2014 the European Energy Security Strategy included an extensive approach for reducing dependency, researching all types of exploitable resources, preventing supply halts and supporting the trend of clean energy.

In 2014, all the Member states from the European Union conducted a stress test in order to prepare for the winter of 2014/2015 and try to avoid the energy crises of 2006 and 2009. It consisted of a simulated halt of energy supply with for a duration of six month, disrupting the energy import from the Russian Federation through the Ukraine pipeline system and other routes.[18] The test resulted in a much anticipated conclusion: supply disruption would have a massive impact on the European Union, and only with the cooperation of the Member states, would this impact be overcome[19].

8.2. Alternatives to Eastern energy

The lack of diversity when it comes to the EU's energy imports is one of the biggest threats the Union is currently facing. Over the last decade, Europe has been the victim of a strategy in which the Russian energy is leveraged to obtain economic and political gains[20]. If this situation continues, the EU will find itself in further danger, as its dependence leaves it beholden to interests of the East.[21]

According to the ECFR, most of the EU's Russian contracts on energy imports are to expire until 2025, opening a window for the Member states to diversify their sources of supply.[22]

[17]Eurostat infographs. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/infographs/energy/bloc-2c.html
[18]Energy security strategy.The European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/energy-security-strategy [01.12.2019]
[19] Ibid.
[20]Cf.: Zeyno, B.(2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. The Washington Quarterly. P.132
[21]Cf.: Ibid.
[22]Chyong, C. K. &Slavkova, L. &Tcherneva, V. Europe's alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]

Figure 4: EU's alternatives to Russian gas[23]

While multiple gas import alternatives are available in other regions of the world, one must acknowledge the fact that each and every one of them has its own circumstances and geopolitical implications. Figure 4 highlights two of the most viable opportunities for the European Union:

- Imports from the Middle East and North Africa;
- Imports of liquefied natural gas from the United States, Australia and EA.

The first alternative of the two is the most relevant one to our debated topic. Most of the states listed in figure 4 are subject to political unrest and turmoil, with multiple factors interfering in a possible energy export deal, like poor infrastructure, war-torn regions controlled by hostile factions and deficient welfare.

8.3. CSDP missions and operations on energy security

Launching a CSDP mission or operation represents a five-step process, involving a complex, decision-making process driven by multiple entities of the European Union.[24]

[23] Ibid.

- Monitoring and early warning
- Drawing the Crisis Management Concept
- Operation planning
- Deployment and implementation
- Strategic review[25]

Assuredly, all of the phases presented above are applicable to the subject of energy security. Even though there is a lack of such CSDP operations, this sub-chapter will review whether the EU needs such missions and operations and the possibility of co-existence with the already existing ones in the regions showed in figure 4.

8.3.1. Libya

The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya, for short EUBAM Libya is a civilian CSDP mission launched on 4 August 2016 and is, according to the EEAS, "part of the EU's comprehensive approach to support the transition to a democratic, stable and prosperous Libya".[26] Before we illustrate the possible influence that EUBAM Libya could have on an energy deal with the European Union, it is important to outline the geopolitical context and infrastructure technicalities.

Libya currently holds an impressive export potential, especially to the Member states. More than 85% of Libyan oil exports and almost all of the natural gas have Europe as their destination, the majority of the exports flowing through the Greenstream pipeline and under the form of LNG.[27]The lack of export infrastructure and the state of political unrest in the region determine that Libya is unlikely to be a reliable partner in energy exports without proper assistance from the European Union,, hence the need for actual CSDP measures in order to prevent these from happening again.

[24]Cf.: Xavier, A. &Rehrl, J. Handbook on CSDP. Volume I. CSDP missions and operations. Volume I. Edited by Rehrl, J. P.78
[25] Cf.: Ibid.
[26]Homepage of the EEAS. About EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM). URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/eubam-libya/3859/about-eu-border-assistance-mission-libya-eubam_en [02.12.2019]
[27]Homepage of U.S. Energy Information Administration. Libya is a major energy exporter, especially to Europe. URL: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=590 [02.12.2019]

Even though EUBAM Libya is a "border assistance" mission, the co-existence with a mission on energy security would be completely viable and they would definitely reinforce each other. This is achievable with a correct implementation of a Special Envoy on International Energy[28] integrated into a CSDP framework, specially designed for the region.

8.3.2. Nigeria, Niger and Algeria

The Trans-Saharan project is an ambitious objective of the energy zone; it comprises a 4400km long gas pipeline stretching from Nigeria to Algeria via Niger, assuring the flow into the European continent through Spain.

Statistically, the three are important and consistent partners to the EU in exporting oil and natural gas, with Algeria entertaining high level meetings with the Union's energy sector representatives accessing European investments in infrastructure projects, such as LNG and natural gas.[29].

Figure 5: Gas pipelines in North & Central Africa[30]

[28]Chyong, C. K. &Slavkova, L. &Tcherneva, V. Europe's alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]
[29]The European Commission. The European Union and Algeria strengthen their energy partnership. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/european-union-and-algeria-strengthen-their-energy-partnership-2018-nov-19_en [03.12.2019]
[30]Greenstream pipeline. URL: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenstream_pipeline [03.12.2019]

In spite of their rich natural resources, these three states are also known to be the most dangerous conflict zones in the world. EUCAP Sahel Niger is a CSDP's civilian mission launched to assist the authorities fighting terrorism and organized crime.[31] The European Union has identified the need of serious assistance in the region, with Sahel being one of the poorest zones in Africa. Enforcing the energy security measures from the CSDP approach, with European investments and representatives in the region, joined by troops in the region, could mean a more accelerated development process of the Trans-Saharan pipeline.

8.4. Climate change and renewable energy

In 2008, Javier Solana, then the High Representative for Foreign Policy, together with the European Commission published a paper called "Climate change and international security" in which climate change was a "threat multiplier"[32]In 2010 William Hague suggested that: "Climate change is perhaps the twenty-first century's biggest foreign policy challenge.'' Analysts predict climate-induced threats such as: mass migrations, border insecurities, low resource availability, state fragility and even a closing down to the international trading system.[33]

A number of CSDP missions and operations are already deployed in climate-challenged regions: EUTM / EUCAP Mali, EU NAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Somalia having as main objectives to fight off some of the threats listed above. However, the climate factors are neither the primary nor even the secondary circumstances or reasons of deployment, although, the aggravating climate change process is directly proportional with the hazards being fought off by the specified missions.

The obvious wanted achievement is, of course, renewable and clean energy. However, this complex process must be carefully analyzed, because the renewable sector has its own market with shares, profits and interests.

[31]The European External Action Service.EUCAP Sahel Niger.Factsheet. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eucap_sahel_niger_general_factsheet_en_2019.pdf [03.12.2019]
[32] Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.
[33] Cf.: Ibid. P.101.

To respect the objectives in the 2014 strategy, the European Union must be careful when it engages in researching and implementing large-scale, clean energy projects in developing countries, as it will ultimately be used for export.[34] While the intentions might be good, attention has to be put into the possible, unwanted, reverse of the medal: quick grab and exporting of renewable might worsen the geopolitical conflicts in the "host countries"[35], especially on the region of North Africa in the detriment of genuine, long-lasting energy partnerships. If at the first sight, these factors go far beyond the frameworks of CSDP, the consequences of such actions, counter-intuitive as they are, ultimately have an impact in worsening the threats that the current missions and operations are fighting. This ultimately can lead to a devastating Hydra effect: cut off one head of the climate change giant and two more shall grow back.

[34] Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.P.113.
[35] Cf.: Ibid.

9. Discussion of results and personal conclusions

This whole research process has brought us valuable statistics, measures, possibilities and the capability to anticipate future evolutions of the energy security, with each of them to be reviewed in the following sub-chapters.

9.1. Diversifying the energy supply

A major part of the research chapter was focused on the European Union's alternatives to the Russian exports of energy. We have identified multiple such alternatives, ranging from the LNG of the United States of America to the oil and natural gas of the MENA region. Without any doubt, each and every one of them has its advantages and disadvantages.

The Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region is known for its political unrest and turmoil in the region. However, this zone represents the most viable partner of the EU in securing its energy supplies. With the already present CSDP missions and operations in the region, negotiations of such a partnership could easily be conducted and viable solutions for both sides would be accomplished, which is a tremendously positive argument. On the other hand, these conflict-torn zones suffer from lack of infrastructure (the case of Libya).

Algeria's export potential is limited due its difficulties in launching and supporting new projects[36], with the clear example of the Trans-Saharan pipeline currently under development. "Europe's goal of significantly diversifying away from Russian gas is challenging but not impossible in the short to medium term."[37]

[36] Cf.: Chyong, C. K. &Slavkova, L. &Tcherneva, V. Europe's alternatives to Russian gas. URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666 [02.12.2019]
[37] Ibid.

9.2. Sustainability of CSDP missions on energy security

We have previously highlighted the notion of possible CSDP missions and operations in regions that are already subject to the CSDP and represent a possible valuable partner in terms of energy imports. This could be implemented by either reworking of the current civilian missions, such as EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUTM RCA in Central African Republic, or by deploying new, objective-oriented CSDP operations. As this is, at the first sight, the easiest method of implementation, the main disadvantage is the possible "shift of interests" and neglection of the actual objectives (border security, civilian security reforms, troop training and so on). The five steps required to launch a CSDP operation are completely applicable to the issue of energy security and could productively co-exist with the already deployed missions. The main actor that should be included in such a procedure is a Special Envoy on International Energy, directly responsible for supervising the research, negotiations and infrastructure reforming in order for oil transportation or natural gas flow through intercontinental pipelines to properly function. This hypothetical, complex process has to be carefully conducted having in mind the fragility of the region. This is why such CSDP missions should take the form of a "partnership", with a full-on support from the "host government" – to avoid the non-sense, but possible public speculations of land grabbing and energy draining from the territory of a developing country.

9.3. Fighting climate change

It is of utmost importance that after reading this paper, the reader acknowledges that climate change has an impact on the CFSP and that energy security is no longer perceived purely on the ever changing factors of oil and natural gas exports.[38]

Evidence has highlighted that developing, conflicted and geopolitically challenged countries suffer heavily from the polluting habits of the world powers. It is the European Union's responsibility, as the leading economy in the world, to respect its commitment for 2030.

[38] Cf.: Youngs, R. (2014). Article. Climate change and EU Security Policy: an Unmet Challenge.P.102.

The main threats that the CSDP is facing in its operations are induced by climate change, and we have identified interdependence between the two. Migration, border instability and civilian outbreaks are only to amplify if living conditions will be worsened by the effects of a changing climate.

Renewable energy is the most obvious solution for this problem, but it is also known to be a sensitive market. The EU heavily invests in this market, but we have emphasized that the Union should review its actions "with a grain of salt" – the exports of renewable energy from developing countries should not be rushed, as they can represent a destabilizing factor of the already disorganized society, and should rather focus instead on developing clean energy on the territory of the Member states.

9.4. Conclusion and personal opinion

The European society is undoubtedly on the verge of energy revolution. In the following decade, the Union will benefit from a large diversity of energy supplies, transforming the "eastern bonds" into a well-defined partnership, without the fear of possible outages or energy crises as those experienced in the past. After a thorough analysis, my conclusion is that the main factor that will influence this process is the Common Security and Defence Policy with newly designed frameworks applicable for maintaining the security of the EU's supplies. Together with the already existent missions and operations in the MENA regions, I am convinced that the stabilization process of the zone will be heavily accelerated while also serving the European Union's import interests.

.Inevitably, these possibilities conduct us to the analogy with the third law of motion presented in the preface: every action that the Union is taking into the direction of securing its energy supplies and climate challenges, will have equal reactions ranging from close-ranging, geopolitical ones to natural, devastating consequences.

10. Annexes

10.1. List of abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEAS	European External Affairs Service
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assist Mission
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
NAVFOR	Naval Force
MENA	Middle-East & North Africa

10.2. Figures

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10.3. Literature

10.3.1. Books

1. Aleh C. & Jessica J. (2014). The concept of energy security.Beyond the four As. Elsevier. Abstract.
2. Winzer C. (2012). Energy Policy. Volume 46. Elsevier. Pg. 36-48.
3. Rehrl J. (2017). Handbook on CSDP. Volume I.
4. Zeyno, B.(2007). EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage. The Washington Quarterly
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10.3.2. Official documents

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11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on. I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarize, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them. I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature ……

Cpl.Std. Șerban-Ionuț Oboroceanu

Bucharest, Romania, December 2019